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1 - Introduction 
 
Freedom of expression is perhaps the most fundamental and important of 
all in a democratic polity. It is axiomatic, essential and paramount to liberal 
democracy that all should be allowed to express their views and ideas 
freely. Without a free exchange of opinions in “the marketplace of ideas”1 
there is no hope for the pursuit of happiness and self-fulfillment, for liberty 
and collective self-determination, and ultimately not even for life and safety 
from tyranny. As Hans Kelsen noted: 
 
“The will of the community, in a democracy, is always created through 
a running discussion between majority and minority, through free 
consideration of arguments for and against a certain regulation of a 
subject matter. This discussion takes place not only in parliament, but 
also, and foremost, at political meetings, in newspapers, books, and 
other vehicles of public opinion. A democracy without public opinion 
is a contradiction in terms”2. 
 
Thus, the earliest modern constitutional texts - the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen3 and the U.S. "Bill of 
                                                          
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 For the first use of this metaphor see, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), at 
630. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), at 56. See also, D.D. McGEOUGH, Selling 
the "Marketplace of Ideas" and Buying Fish, Bollinger, and Baker, in Kaleidoscope: A Graduate 
Journal of Qualitative Communication Research, 4/2011, p. 37 ss. 
2 H. KELSEN, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1961, p. 287 s. 
3 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (August 26, 1789), 
Article 11: "The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of 
the rights of man. Every citizen may accordingly speak, write and print with freedom, but 
shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law." 
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Rights"4 - enshrine this pillar of democracy and guarantee the freedom to 
communicate ideas and opinions, as do all since5. Naturally, the law of free 
speech in Western democracies has generated a vast doctrinal typography 
and intricate typologies, frequently questioned and reviewed, based on the 
same fundamental concept. However, from this point of universal 
consensus upon the central import of free speech to democracy there 
diverge very different paths and paradigms. 
All agree that Freedom of Speech (FOS) is not absolute6, nor even 
close to absolute. Exceptions include not only the famous, obvious and very 
extreme examples of crying "fire" in a crowded theater7, or divulging state 
secrets; defamation8, threats, incitement to violence or “fighting words”9; 
but also cases where one's speech will cause lesser harm, such as verbal 
sexual harassment for example10. Such is prohibited even when not of any 
                                                          
4 The Bill of Rights (September 25, 1789) includes the first 10 amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution to be ratified by three fourths of the state legislatures as required (December 
15, 1791), the first of which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances."  
5 A search for the topic of freedom of expression in the recently launched Constitute 
Project yields 183 in-force constitutions, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. To this end see: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=express&status=in_force. It should be 
noted that a measure of free speech was present in Greek democracy as well, in the form 
of Isegoria (ἰσηγορί α) and Parrhesia (παρρησί α). See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, The Meaning and 
Evolution of the Word Parrhesia in Discourse & Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia, 
University of California Press, Berkley, 1983. 
6 Though the more extreme view is sometimes called 'absolutist', apparently based on 
the dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), at 285 and 275, which stated that 
FOS was “couched in absolute terms” and absolutely forbids its abridgement “without any 
‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases’”. 
7 See, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justice Holmes’ dissent, at 52.  
8 See, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). See also, R.A. EPSTEIN, Was 
New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, in University of Chicago Law Review, 53/1986, p. 782 ss. 
9 See, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), at 571 - 572: “There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words-those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It 
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” See, R. 
O’NEIL, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment’s Third Century, in Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 2/2002, p. 7 ss. See also fn. 12, regarding "catcalling". 
10 See: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
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violent or threatening nature that might create an atmosphere of physical 
danger to the victim, but "merely" causes her the discomfort of being in a 
hostile and offensive environment11. Thus, victims' rights not to be 
distressed justify limiting harassers' right to express themselves12. 
Additional historical exceptions include obscene language and behavior13, 
public nudity, contempt of court14, and disorderly conduct towards police 
officers15.  
Finally, a very common and salient limitation upon freedom of 
expression which is of special significance when considering the 
desecration of flags and religious books, is the prohibition of “hate 
speech”16 - speech that provokes or justifies racial, religious or other 
collective hatred. The question of hate speech is a defining watershed 
difference between the unique and more extremist American position on 
the appropriate extent of freedom of speech and the much more moderate 
European model17.  
Most European democracies prohibit hate speech and holocaust 
denial18, as they do flag-desecration. This is the plain understanding of the 
                                                          
510 U.S. 17 (1993).  
11 See, The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Sexual 
Harassment: https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm. Harassment in the 
workplace based on race, color, religion, national origin, age (40 or older), disability or 
genetic information is also prohibited. 
12 It may be of interest to note that even the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) - 
traditionally the ultimate defender of maximal FOS protection - recently tweeted an 
endorsement of a ban on “catcalling”, i.e. street harassment of women, after France 
outlawed the same. The tweet was quickly deleted. At this purpose see: 
https://reason.com/blog/2018/08/03/aclu-catcalling-free-speech-tweet. 
13 See: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1965). J.M. FINNIS, Reason and Passion: The 
Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
116/1967, p. 222 ss.; M. HEINS, Sex, Sin, and Blasphemy: A Guide to America's Censorship 
Wars, The New Press, New York, 1993. 
14 On this matter see, though long overturned, Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
15 See, State of Montana v. Malachi Cody Robinson, 2003 MT 364. 
16 For one of the first usages of the term see, R. DELGADO, Words That Wound: A Tort 
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, in Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties 
Law Review, 16/1982, p. 133. 
17 See, E. BLEICH, The Freedom to Be Racist?: How the United States and Europe Struggle to 
Preserve Freedom and Combat Racism, Oxford University Press, 2011; R. POST, Hate Speech, 
in Extreme Speech and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 123 ss. 
18 See, Hans-Jürgen Witzsch v. Germany, Application no. 7485/03, 13 December 2005; 
Roger Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65831/01, 7 July 2003; Case of Lehideux and Isorni v. 
France, Application no. 55/1997/839/1045, 23 September 1998; Marais v. France, 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which allows 
States to restrict freedom of expression for the sake of "respect of the rights 
or reputations of others"19, and actually mandates the prohibition of "any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence"20. 
Although not a case of hate speech, it is worth noting in this context 
a very disturbing decision given recently by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which demonstrates the extent to which Europe is willing to curb 
freedom of expression. The ECtHR upheld the conviction by Austrian 
courts of a woman for “publicly disparaging an object of veneration of a 
domestic church or religious society, namely Muhammad, the Prophet of 
Islam, in a manner capable of arousing justified indignation”21. The woman 
asserted in a public seminar titled “Basic Information on Islam”, given at 
the Education Institute of the right-wing Freedom Party, that Muhammad 
was pedophilic, since he consummated a marriage to a nine-year-old girl. 
For this, she was sentenced to a fine of €480 or six months in prison.  
American FOS doctrine, on the other hand, has developed over the 
last half century to liberally allow hate speech, barring clear and present 
danger of violence22. The Supreme Court of the United States has defended 
                                                          
Application No. 31159/96, 24 June 1996; Gerd Honsik v. Austria, Application No. 25062/94, 
18 October 1995. The European Court of Human Rights. Factsheet - Hate Speech 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. A. WEBBER, Manual on Hate 
Speech, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2009; M. WHINE, Expanding Holocaust 
Denial and Legislation Against It, in edited by I. HARE, J. WEINSTEIN, Extreme Speech and 
Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), p. 538 ss.; P. LOBBA, Holocaust Denial 
before the European Court of Human Rights: Evolution of an Exceptional Regime, 26:1 The 
European Journal of International Law, 2015, p. 237 ss. Of note in this context is the recent 
legislation in Poland criminalizing statements about Polish corroboration with the Nazis, 
especially using the term “Polish Death Camp”, punishable by three years’ imprisonment. 
The law attracted international condemnation and the criminal sanctions were later 
repealed, in a diplomatic agreement with Israel, which has aroused its own controversy. 
See, for example, M. SANTORA, Poland’s Holocaust Law Weakened After Storm and 
Consternation, in The New York Times, June 27, 2018: 
19 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Section 19(3)(a). 
20 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Section 20(2). 
21 Case of E.S. v. Austria, Application no. 38450/12, 25 October 2018. 
See also, Case of Jersild v. Denmark, Application no. 15890/89, 23 September 1994; Mark 
Anthony Norwood v. United Kingdom, Application no. 23131/03, 16 November 2004; Hate 
Speech, Factsheet: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf. 
22 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justice Holmes’ dissent, at 52. This being 
in contrast to the earlier 5-4 ruling given in 1952 in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, which 
upheld criminalizing collective vilification of blacks as group-libel. Though never explicitly 
overturned, subsequent decisions de-facto voided Beauharnais, and subjected even 
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a Ku-Klux-Klansman that called for violence against blacks and Jews - 
ruling that speech may only be proscribed if it is both “directed at inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action” and is also actually ”likely to incite 
or produce such action”23; has allowed Nazis to hold a march in full Nazi 
uniform and regalia in Skokie, Illinois - a predominantly Jewish suburb of 
Chicago and home to many Holocaust survivors24; has struck down laws 
restricting cross-burning25; and has protected anti-homosexuality picketing 
at a military funeral26. 
While the American paradigm is more protective of FOS, it does so 
at the cost of deliberately ignoring the need - especially in culturally diverse 
societies common in democratic countries nowadays - for dialogue rather 
than confrontation, for tolerance rather than hostility and for a pluralistic 
respect of the dignity and integrity others and that which they cherish. The 
European paradigm on the other hand, sacrifices some freedom of 
expression for the sake of protecting the sensibilities of the different 
segments of society, though it appears be taking this to new and alarming 
extremes, as described above. 
                                                          
individual libel laws to FOS. See Sullivan, fn. 8; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974). See also the recent Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. (2017). Beauharnais quotes the language 
of Chaplinsky, see fn. 9, which was given unanimously merely a decade earlier, concerning 
types of speech whose prevention raises no constitutional problem. Chaplinsky been 
similarly eroded by the subsequent decisions detailed infra. Similar dictum can be found 
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), also given unanimously, at 309 - 310. These 
cases demonstrate the gradual paradigm shift in American Freedom of Speech 
jurisprudence, in the decades after World War II, from a unanimous emphasis on the 
ideational rationale of expression - which leads to results closer to the European model 
allowing restriction of speech lacking ideational value, to a narrow majority holding the 
same, and finally to an emphasis on libertarian justifications for FOS - which result in much 
more expansive protection of speech even when such has no value. This basic paradigm 
shift is of course central to other fundamental questions concerning FOS, such as corporate 
speech and campaign financing, the protection of artistic speech and commercial speech, 
wherein a parallel trend has occurred. See, for example, M.H. REDISH, K. VOILS, False 
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency 
Principle, in William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 25/2017, p. 765 ss. M.N. WEILAND, 
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 
69:5 Stanford Law Review, 5/2017) p. 1389 ss. 
23 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), 447. 
24 Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), denying certiorari. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 
1197 (7th Cir. 1978) 1206. 
25 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). See also, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), 
which ruled that prohibiting cross burning intended to intimidate is constitutional, if such 
intent is proven and not presumed. 
26 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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The theoretical question of the proper perimeters of such 
infringements upon freedom of expression aside, legislation outlawing the 
desecration of flags or other national symbols on the one hand, and of 
religious books or other venerated objects on the other hand, can be seen as 
a measure of the emphasis ascribed in a jurisdiction to tolerance and 
pluralism as a justification for limiting democratic rights. 
Following, is a critical review of the legislation and case-law of flag 
burning statutes, and statutes outlawing the desecration of religious books, 
in Israel. Besides the historic and comparative insights to be gleaned from 
this research, it will also include some analysis of the arguments given in 
favor of such legislation, or their rejection. 
 
 
2 - Flag Protection. Legislation 
 
The Israeli flag, which consists of a light blue Star-of-David between two 
horizontal stripes of the same color over a white background, had for half a 
century been the flag of the Zionist Organization27. It was authorized as the 
state flag in October 1948 by the Provisional Council-of-State. The 
Provisional Government had called upon the public to submit their 
proposals to an especially formed committee and, out of the hundreds 
suggested, selected a design consisting of seven golden stars between two 
blue stripes over a white background. However, the Provisional Council-
of-State rejected the Provisional Government’s decision and after 
appointing a committee of its own approved the existing design28. 
The state emblem contains a Menorah (Biblical seven-branched 
candelabrum) in the center, modeled after its depiction on Titus’ Arch in 
Rome, flanked by olive branches on either side and the word “Israel” 
connecting the branches at the bottom. It was chosen in February 1949 by 
the Provisional Council-of-State, after similarly rejecting the design 
endorsed by the Provisional Government after considering the public’s 
proposals, as well as other designs later proposed. The Provisional Council-
of-State called for a second round of proposals from the public, in which the 
existing emblem was finally chosen, with slight modifications29. 
                                                          
27 Today called the World Zionist Organization. 
28 See, State Archives of Israel, "Blue and White Pages 2018". See also, the flag of Israel’s 
merchant marine, Ships Ordinance (Nationality and Flag) 1948, Official Gazette 
(Provisional Government) 2 (21 May 1948) p. 6 s. Shipping (Vessels) Law 5720 - 1960, 
Section 86. “Book of Laws" 315 (14 August 1960) p. 70 ss. 
29 Ibidem. 
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In May 1949, the Israeli Knesset enacted the “Law of the Flag and the 
Emblem, 5709-1949”30 [heretofore: the Flag Law or the law]31. The Flag Law 
references the specifications of the flag and the emblem32, as per the 
respective declarations of the Provisional Government which were 
published in the Official Gazette33.  
The law then prohibits any commercial use of the flag without 
written permission from the Minister of the Interior34, save for its display, 
manufacture and sale35, punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment, a 
fine of up to 150 pounds36, or both37. The law is even stricter with regard to 
the state emblem38, proscribing the production of any object bearing the 
emblem39, as well as any use of the emblem, without similar authorization40, 
and ascribing similar penalties to unauthorized production or use41. This 
difference is due to the fact that unlike the flag, which citizens are expected 
                                                          
30 “Book of Laws” 8 (24 May 1949) p. 37 s. In 2004, the law’s name was amended, and it 
is now “The Law of the Flag, the Emblem and the Anthem of the State, 5709-1949”. 
31 Heretofore, where applicable and not otherwise specified, mention of the flag 
includes the emblem as well. 
32 The Flag Law, Section 1 - Interpretation, 1(a) and 1(b), respectively. Section 1(a) also 
includes flags of any size or any object that has an image of the state flag on it. See also, 
Section 8(a) and 8(b), fn. 34, 38 and 67. 
33 Deceleration of the Flag of the State of Israel, Official Gazette (Provisional 
Government) 32 (12 November 1948) p. 62. Declaration of the Emblem of the State of Israel, 
Official Gazette (Provisional Government) 50 (12 February 1949) p. 404. 
34 Flag Law, Section 2 - Use of State Flag for Purposes of Commerce, Etc. This applies to 
flags that are similar to the state flag and might be mistaken for it, and objects bearing its 
design, as well. See Section 8 - Similar Flags and Emblems, 8(a). 
35 The Flag Law, Section 2(a). 
36 This amount is equivalent to the purchasing power of almost 1500 USD today. 
Independent penal legislation greatly increases the maximum amount to 29,200 NIS, 
adjusted for inflation. See, Penal Law, Section 61(a)(2), “Book of Laws” 959 (08 February 
1980) p. 60. As further amended by Penal Order (Change of Fine Amounts) 5770 - 2010, 
Section 1(3). See, “Regulations Compilation” 6877 (14 March 2010) p. 948. 
37 The Flag Law, Section 2(b). See also, section 4(a)-(b) as to the manner of granting of 
such permission. 
38 This applies to an emblem that is similar to the state emblem and might be mistaken 
for it, as well. See Section 8 - Similar Flags and Emblems, 8(b). 
39 The Flag Law, Section 3 - Use of State Emblem, 3(a). See also, Section 4 - Conditions 
of License or Permit. 
40 The Flag Law, Section 3(b). 
41 The Flag Law, Section 3(c).  
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to fly and must necessarily be manufactured and sold, the emblem is not 
intended for private use at all42. 
These clauses, which may today seem archaic, are not fully 
implemented. They have never been criminally prosecuted. But the 
prohibition of unauthorized use of the emblem is cited and reiterated in 
internal government guidelines and codes of conduct43, and has been 
grounds for disciplinary action against a senior government official who 
used letterheads and business cards with the national insignia for his own 
political purposes, although he paid for their printing out of his own 
pocket44. 
They are also very significant for gleaning a proper understanding 
of the law’s paradigm as to the essential nature of national symbols. These 
are seen as actually belonging to the collectivity of the nation, the 
manifestation of which achieves legal personality and competency in the 
state, which must therefore grant its consent for them to be used privately 
in any manner beyond their intended purposes45. 
It is of interest to note in this context, that the same approach was 
echoed in Israel’s Penal Law. Enacted in 1977, the law gave Israeli courts 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses committed against Israeli interests. 
The law goes on to specifically include in this authority46, inter alia, offences 
under the Flag Law and the State Seal Law47. Here too, national symbols are 
seen as property of the state, which must protect them and punish those 
who harm them, wherever they may be. Of course, from a practical 
perspective this is quite unfeasible and perhaps dated, and the law was in 
fact amended in 199448. But the core paradigm is nevertheless sound, and 
                                                          
42 See, minutes of the Knesset plenary’s 32 session (18 May 1949) p, 538.  
43 See, Civil Service Regulations (Takshir) Section 62.261. 
44 See, Government Disciplinary Tribunal 94/04, Adv. Galit Shoham v. John Doe (21 
June 2005). The sentence in the case was a reprimand. See, (Supreme Court) Appeal of 
Government Disciplinary Tribunal Decision 9345/05, State of Israel v. Yoel Chasson (13 
November 2007). 
45 And Cf., Law of the State Seal 5710 - 1949, Section 5(b). “Book of Laws” 28 (07 
December 1949); Law for the Protection of Emblems, 5735 - 1974, Section 4. “Book of Laws” 
751 (19 December 1974) p. 22 s. 
46 The Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part One: General Provisions, Chapter Two: Territorial 
Application, Section 5(b)(2) - Offences Against the State. “Book of Laws” 864 (4 August 
1977) pp. 224 - 306. See official English translation, Laws of the State of Israel, Special 
Volume (31A) Penal Law 5737 - 1977, p. 11. 
47 See fn. 45. 
48 The Penal Law (Amendment No. 49) (Preliminary Part and General Part) 5754 - 1994. 
“Book of Laws” 1481 (23 August 1994) pp. 348 - 359. 
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particularly pertinent to our analysis and understanding of limiting 
freedom of expression for the sake of protecting national symbols. 
We now come to the substantive part of the Flag Law, the desecration 
clause, which assigns a punishment for offending the dignity of the flag or 
the emblem: 
 
“A person who insults, or causes to be insulted, the State Flag or the 
State emblem, or uses the State flag or the State emblem in a manner 
constituting an insult to it, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding […] or to a fine not exceeding […] or to both such 
penalties”49. 
 
Originally, the penalty was double that prescribed to unauthorized 
use or manufacture of the flag or the emblem, i.e., up to one year’s 
imprisonment, a fine of up to 300 pounds, or both. The Knesset amended 
the law in 201650, tripling the maximum prison term for desecrating the flag 
from one year to three, thus aligning it with the maximal punishment for 
the desecration of foreign flags, and doubling the maximum fine to over 
58,400 NIS51. 
But as we shall later see, the law’s punch is in practice not as strong 
as it may immediately seem. The legal establishment in Israel is mindful of 
the constitutional difficulty of restricting expression, and wary of wielding 
the law’s power too freely. Despite the letter of the law, it is applied 
sparingly and with great restraint52. 
                                                          
49 Flag Law, Section 5 - Insult to the State Flag or the State Emblem. 
50 See, Law of the Flag, the Emblem and the Anthem of the State (Amendment No. 7) 
5776 - 2016, “Book of Laws” 2567 (27 July 2016) p. 1078. 
51 The amount of the maximal fine is not specified, but is linked to double the maximal 
amount of penal fines for crimes carrying a maximal imprisonment term of one year, which 
is 29,200 NIS, adjusted for inflation. The maximal fine for crimes carrying a maximal prison 
term of three years, as the amended clause does, is much more than double that amount, 
75,300. See fn. 36. It is not clear why the amendment tripled the maximal prison term, but 
only doubled the maximal fine. A punishment of a fine, which is of course less harsh than 
imprisonment, is not available for insulting a foreign flag. Hence, the amendment did not 
entirely eliminate the inconsistency between the punishments for insulting the state flag 
and foreign flags. 
52 Additional legislation which is protective of the flag is Amendment No. 40 to the 
Budget Foundations Law 5745 - 1985, passed in 2011. This permits the Minister of Finance 
to reduce state funding for an entity that financially supports: the rejection of the State of 
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; incitement to racism, violence or terrorism; terrorist 
activity; commemorating Independence Day or the day of the establishment of the state as 
a day of mourning; and vandalism or physical desecration that dishonors the state’s flag 
or symbol. The permitted reduction is up to three times the amount used for the above 
purposes. The amendment is intentionally limited to physical desecration and contains 
several additional caveats as well. See, Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40) 5771 
 90 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 33 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
Another criminal offence which could hypothetically be considered 
in cases of flag desecration is the prohibition of sedition, which is 
punishable by five years’ imprisonment53, and defined in Israel’s Penal Law 
as54. 
 
“For the purposes of this article, ‘sedition’ means -  
(1) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection 
against the State or its duly constituted administrative or judicial 
authorities; or 
(2) to incite or excite inhabitants of Israel to attempt to procure 
the alteration otherwise than by lawful means of any matter by law 
established; or 
(3) or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst inhabitants of 
Israel; or  
(4) to promote feelings of ill-will and enmity between different 
sections of the population”. 
 
Burning the flag of a state is an expression of animus and malice 
towards the state and the nation for which it stands. It is a seditious and 
subversive act which is inherently a call to violence against the state. These 
sentiments are often explicit in instances of flag burning by foreign enemies 
of the state, such as the frequent burnings of the flag of the United States of 
America (the “Big Satan”) in Iran and other Middle-Eastern countries, but 
also in some domestic cases. The protesters in the famous American case of 
Texas v. Johnson in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that flag desecration 
                                                          
- 2011, “Book of Laws” 2286 (30 March 2011) pp. 686 - 687. This matter relates to the unique 
circumstances of Israel’s national struggle as a Jewish state and is in any case beyond the 
scope of this work, which is focused on the criminalization of the desecration of national 
and religious artifacts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a petition to the Supreme 
Court to strike down the amendment as unconstitutional was rejected as “unripe”, as the 
law had not been implemented. See, High Court of Justice 3429/11, Alumni Association of 
the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister of Finance (5 January 2012). 
53 Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part Two: Offences, Chapter Eight: Offences Against the 
Political and Social Order, Article One: Sedition, Section 133 - Seditious Acts. Chapter Eight 
is the second chapter in Part Two, after the chapter dealing with treason and espionage, as 
well as impairment of foreign relations (see fn. 129). These offences originated in the 
Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936, available at fn. 132, where they are located in the first 
chapter of Part Two, which includes together treason and sedition, as well as three offences 
against foreign states. See, infra, Section Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. 
- Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, and fn. 133 and 140. In the Ordinance, however, the crime 
of sedition is a misdemeanor, punishable by three years’ imprisonment. 
54 Ibidem, Section 166 - Sedition Defined. This section is based on Section 60(1) of the 
Criminal Code Ordinance almost verbatim, mutatis mutandis, though not divided into 
subsections as in the Penal Law. 
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statutes are unconstitutional55, for example, were chanting “America the 
red, white and blue, we spit on you, you stand for plunder, you will go 
under”56. And while some flag burners will prudently deny such 
motivation and explain their actions otherwise, the fact is that their choice 
of expression is a violent one which undeniably implies a strong urge to 
hurt that and those for which the flag stands. 
In the unique American paradigm, this is of course irrelevant, since 
even explicitly seditious calls for violence must be tolerated as long as they 
do not pose the likelihood of inciting imminent lawless action. But for 
jurisdictions that espouse a more moderate paradigm of freedom of 
expression, as does Israel, seeing flag desecration as sedition is quite cogent. 
In March of 1990, three months before the Johnson decision was given by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Germany used this rationale to justify the constitutionality of the law which 
penalizes expressing contempt for the state or insulting its flag, its national 
emblem or its national anthem by up to three years’ imprisonment57. The 
                                                          
55 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (June 21, 1989). 
56 Ibidem, at 431. 
57 See, Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) 15 May 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt I 127; 10 February 2009, 
Bundgesetzblatt I 3214, Specific Part, Chapter One - Crimes Against the Peace of Nations; 
High Treason; Endangering the Democratic State under the Rule of Law, Third Title - 
Endangering the Democratic State under the Rule of Law, Section 90a - Defamation of the 
State and its Symbols: 
(1) Whosoever publicly, in a meeting or through the dissemination of written materials 
1. insults or maliciously expresses contempt of the Federal Republic of Germany or one 
of its states or its constitutional order; or 
2. insults the colors, flag, coat of arms or the anthem of the Federal Republic of Germany 
or one of its states shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. 
(2) Whosoever removes, destroys, damages, renders unusable or defaces, or otherwise 
insults by mischief a publicly displayed flag of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of 
its states or a national emblem installed by a public authority of the Federal Republic of 
Germany or one of its states shall incur the same liability. Attempt to commit the above 
shall be punishable. 
(3) The penalty shall be imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine if the offender 
by the act intentionally supports efforts against the continued existence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany or against its constitutional principles. 
See also section 90 - Defamation of the President of the Federation, and Section 90b - 
Anti-Constitutional Defamation of Constitutional Organs. It is noteworthy here that the 
StGB also prohibits insult to officially flown flags of foreign states with which Germany 
maintains diplomatic relations and reciprocate this prohibition. The offence may be 
prosecuted if the foreign state requests it, and it must be authorized by the federal 
government of Germany. See, Specific Part, Chapter Three - Offences Against Foreign 
States, Section 104 - Violation of Flags and State symbols of Foreign States; Section 104a - 
Conditions for Prosecution. (See also, Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 
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court held that the flag is constitutionally protected58, that “the Republic is 
dependent on the identification of its citizens with the basic values 
symbolized by the flag”, and that defaming the flag could “injure the 
authority of the state which is necessary for internal peace”59. 
                                                          
WD 3 - 3000 - 042/18, Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen zur Strafbarkeit der Verunglimpfung 
Israelischer Flaggen, 5 March 2018). Chapter Three contains two additional offences 
against foreign states, Section 102 - Attacks Against Organs and Representatives of Foreign 
States, and Section 103 - Defamation of Organs and Representatives of Foreign States. 
Section 103 was recently repealed as outdated. See, Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2017 Nr. 48, 21 
July 2017, Gesetz zur Reform der Straftaten gegen ausländische Staaten.  
58 The right to artistic expression is protected by of the German constitution (Basic Law), 
Section 5(3). This artistic privilege is more expansive than the general freedom to express 
opinions, and may only be restricted to protect constitutional values, such as human 
dignity. Hence, the court had to assert that protecting the flag is a constitutional value. In 
fact, the constitution merely states that the federal flag shall be black, red and gold. See, 
Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 23 May 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt 1, Article 22 - 
Federal Capital; Federal Flag. See also, Article 5 - Freedom of expression, Arts and Sciences. 
59 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 81, 278 (1 BvR 266/86, 
913/87) 7 March 1990, 32 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1983. P.E. QUINT, The 
Comparative Law of Flag Desecration: The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 15/1992, p. 613 ss.; B. J. BLEISE, Freedom 
of Speech and Flag Desecration: A Comparative Study of German, European and United States 
Laws, 20:3 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 1992, p. 471 ss. In the case, a 
bookseller was prosecuted for selling an anti-militarist collection with a collage of urinating 
on the flag on its back cover. He was fined by a lower court in the sum of 4,500 DM. 
(Criminal fines in Germany run as between 5 and 360 “daily income” units, based on the 
defendant’s income, with a maximal cap of 30,000 per day. See, StGB Section 40. This was 
a 30 days’ fine for the defendant). Despite the Constitutional Court’s theoretical 
justification of the flag desecration clause, it declined to actually enforce the law and punish 
the defendant. Rather, the Constitutional Court ruled that the lower court did not properly 
balance the law with the right to artistic expression protected by the Section 5(3) of the 
constitution (Basic Law), as the “expressive core” of the collage was not actually aimed at 
the state. The court interpreted the “expressive core” of the artistic expression as being an 
attack on militarism and not on the flag or the state, which is the goal of the attack “only 
insofar as it was responsible for the establishment of military service". Thus, the urination 
on the flag is merely the “form” of the expression, not its essential core. In a similar case 
decided by the Constitutional Court on the same day, a lower court sentenced the 
defendant to four months’ imprisonment for publishing a parody of the national anthem, 
finding that his purpose was to attack the anthem and thus the Federal Republic itself, 
which impairs the "state-feeling" and therefore endangers the basic democratic order. The 
Constitutional Court again acknowledged the theoretical constitutionality of the law but 
remanded the case to the lower court for considering that the "expressive core" of the 
parody may have been an attack on "contradictions between pretension and reality" that 
was merely "clothed" in the altered wording of the anthem. Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 81, 298 (1 BvR 1215/87) 7 March 1990. See, P.E. 
QUINT, The Comparative Law cit. See also, B. J. BLEISE, Freedom of Speech cit., p. 390, for a 
conviction in a lower court for the desecration of the State of Bavaria by calling it “the 
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The possibility of prosecuting flag desecration as a seditious act was 
never raised in Israel. This comes as no surprise, considering the reluctance 
described below to charge and convict desecrators of the flag even for 
violating the Flag Law, which is more specific and less punitively severe. 
However, it is interesting to compare and contrast to this a famous case in 
which plotting to commit an act that is offensive to religious sensibilities 
was indeed prosecuted and convicted as being seditious, in addition to 
more specific offences. 
In November 1997, Demian Pekovich plotted to catapult the head of 
a pig with a Koran in its mouth into the Temple Mount. For this he was 
charged and convicted in late March 1999 by a District Court60, of plotting 
to desecrate a Holy Place and to violate feelings regarding it61, and with 
sedition as defined in subsection (4): promoting feelings of ill-will and 
enmity between different sections of the population62. He committed two 
additional crimes for which he was judged and convicted together63, and 
given a combined sentence of five years’ imprisonment, 18 months of which 
were suspended64. An appeal of the conviction and the severity of the 
sentence was rejected by the Supreme Court65. 
                                                          
madhouse of the Republic”. The Supreme Penal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) recently 
affirmed the Federal Constitutional Court's 1990 decision. See BGH 3 StR 27/18, Order of 
30 October 2018. 
60 In Israel, the District Courts are the court of first instance for crimes carrying a 
maximal punishment of more than seven years’ imprisonment. 
61 See, the Protection of Holy Places Law 5727 - 1967, Sections 2(a) and 2(b), and Section 
499 of the Penal Law. Protection of Holy Places Law, “Book of Laws" 499 (28 June 1967) p. 
75. See, official English translation, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 21, 5727 - 1966/67, p. 
76. Despite the existence of other protections of freedom of religion and worship, Israel 
enacted the Protection of Holy Places Law immediately after the liberation of Jerusalem 
and Judea and Samaria in the Six Day War, when many holy places to different religions 
came under its control. 
62 Criminal Case (Jerusalem district Court) 109/98, State of Israel v. Demian Pekovich (30 
March 1999). 
63 Plotting to place the head of a pig on the gravesite of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, and 
torching offices of a left-wing organization. 
64 Criminal Case (Jerusalem district Court) 109/98, State of Israel v. Demian Pekovich (15 
April 1999). 
65 Criminal Appeal (Supreme Court) 3338/99, Demian Pekovich v. State of Israel (20 
December 2000). The Supreme Court concluded its decision with an acknowledgement of 
the need to amend the law of sedition in a manner that will be clearer and compatible with 
the necessity of protecting democracy whilst respecting the principle of legality. For a 
discussion in English of the offence of sedition in Israel see, M. GUR-ARYE, Can Freedom 
of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli Experience, in Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, 1/2003, p. 155 ss.  
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This disparity in enforcement between offences to national interests 
and to religious ones might be due to the very dissimilar repercussions that 
are expected in each of the different cases. Offences to Islam regularly cause 
violence and loss of life66, whereas offences to national sensibilities do not. 
Therefore, enforcement authorities may naturally wish to pursue more 
rigorous enforcement policies when dealing with such, in order to increase 
and reinforce the deterrence of potential offenders in the future, than when 
dealing with similar offences to national symbols. 
The next clause of the law authorizes the Minister of the Interior to 
enact regulations concerning the proper flying and treatment of the flag and 
the preservation of its dignity67. These were enacted in 195368, and contain 
several additional prohibitions pertaining to the flag, each punishable by a 
fine of up to 50 pounds69. These include70: 
 Displaying the flag in public in a layout different than that in 
the Declaration of the Flag of the State of Israel71, in a state not befitting 
dignified use72, or in a place, a time, in circumstances or in a manner 
that constitute an offense to the flag’s honor73. 
                                                          
66 See, e.g., R. POST, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad. 14:1 
Constellations, 2007, p. 72 ss. 
67 The Flag Law, Section 6 - Implementation and Regulations. See also Section 7 - 
Delegation of Powers. This applies to flags and emblems that are similar to those of the 
state and might be mistaken for them, as well. See Section 8 - Similar Flags and Emblems, 
8(a), (b). This section of the law was amended in 1981 (Amendment No. 1), to include the 
enactment of regulations concerning the flying of the flag on government buildings and 
public institutions. New regulations to that effect were not drafted, but the law itself was 
amended in 1986 (Amendment No. 2, Section 2A) and again in 1997 (Amendment No. 3) 
to include such and obligation. Failing to fulfill this obligation is punishable by 
imprisonment for one year. See, “Book of Laws” 1025 (26 May 1981) p. 272. See official 
English translation, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 35, 5741 - 1980/81, p. 328. “Book of 
Laws” 1201 (1 January 1987) p. 24. See official English translation, Laws of the State of 
Israel, Vol. 41, 5747 - 1988/87, p. 24 ss. “Book of Laws” 1631 (24 July 1997) p. 194.  
68 The Flag and Emblem Regulations (Use of the State Flag) 5713 - 1953 (heretofore: Flag 
Regulations). “Regulations Compilation” 355 (16 April 1953) p. 910. 
69 Flag Regulations, Section 4. The maximum for these today stands at 14,400 NIS. See, 
Penal Law, Section 61(a)(1), Penal Order (Change of Fine Amounts) 5770 - 2010, Section 
1(3). 
70 Cf., IDF General Staff Order 33.04 - The State Flag, IDF Flags and Portraits.  
71 Flag Regulations, Section 1(a)(1); Deceleration of the Flag of the State of Israel, Official 
Gazette (Provisional Government) 32 (12 November 1948) p. 62. 
72 Flag Regulations, Section 1(a)(2). 
73 Flag Regulations, Section 1(a)(3). See also, Section 1(b). 
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 Flying the flag on a staff shorter than approximately three 
times its breadth74, or not at the top of the staff75. 
 Flying the state flag together with other flags, unless76: 
o They aren’t flown on the same staff; 
o The state flag is flown on the right, when facing out, or in the 
middle; 
o No other flag is larger or flown higher; 
o No other flagstaff is longer; 
o The state flag is hoisted first and lowered last. 
o It is equal in size to the flags of other countries or nations77. 
As stated above, the law did not include any reference to the national 
anthem. Since 2004 the law’s name was changed to “The Law of the Flag, 
the Emblem and the Anthem of the State, 5709-1949”78, in an amendment 
intended to officially enshrine the national anthem into Israeli law. It is of 
interest to note that the amendment did not envisage any desecration of the 
anthem that might require its protection in a manner similar to that 
provided for the flag and emblem79. Hence, none of the material clauses of 
the law were amended, besides referencing the language of the anthem80, 
by appending it to the law. Interestingly too, the anthem’s melody is not 
mentioned. 
 
3 - Flag Protection. Jurisprudence 
 
                                                          
74 Flag Regulations, Section 2(a). 
75 Flag Regulations, Section 2(b). Except at half-staff in mourning. 
76 Flag Regulations, Section 3(a) - (e). See, High Court of Justice 11190/07, Joseph Azgad 
v. The National Company for Roads in Israel, Ltd. (25 March 2008). 
77 Flag Regulations, Section 3(b). 
78 Amendment No. 4, “Book of Laws” 1961 (17 November 2004) p. 6. 
79 This was noted by the Supreme Court in the decision concerning insulting the anthem 
in an election campaign. 
80 In subsection (c), which was added to Section 1. A similar amendment was made in 
2016 (Amendment No. 6) in which the name of the state, “Israel”, was officially enshrined 
in the law by adding subsection (d) to Section 1, and broadening the Minister of the 
Interior’s authority to include the enactment of regulations not only concerning the proper 
use of the state flag and emblem, but also concerning the proper use of the name of the 
state (but not of the anthem).“Book of Laws” 2537 (17 March 2016) 628. [Amendment No. 
5 of the law, mandating that publicly funded institutions purchase flags that are 
manufactured in Israel, is not relevant to our topic.] 
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Despite lacking a formal constitution for historical and political reasons81, 
and long before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty - which Israel’s very 
judicially active Supreme Court has used as a basis for judicial review of 
legislation for over 20 years82, freedom of speech has always been 
recognized in Israel’s legal system as a fundamental human liberty83, 
deriving directly from the very nature of the State as a liberal democracy84. 
The Israeli legal establishment is well aware of the constitutional challenge 
posed by the Flag Law, the prohibitions of which pointedly suppress 
expressive conduct85. Hence, the authorities are hesitant to wield the law's 
power too freely and apply it cautiously. 
In this vein, the Attorney General has issued a directive to the state 
prosecution about certain cases that require his approval prior to 
indictment, even where the law itself does not formally demand his 
authorization86. Inter alia, this is the case for charges involving flag 
desecration87. Although not explicated, it is safe to presume that this is due 
to the problematical constitutional aspect of such charges vis-à-vis freedom 
of speech. And indeed, such charges and convictions are relatively few and 
far between, and they are also not punished severely as we shall describe 
below. 
                                                          
81 On this see, e.g., R. GAVISON, The Israeli Constitutional Process: Legislative 
Ambivalence and Judicial Resolute Drive, Center for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper # 
380, 2/2005, in http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp380.pdf.  
82Along with Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. 
83 High Court of Justice 73/53, Kol HaAm (Voice of the Nation) Co., Ltd. v. Minister of the 
Interior (16 October 1953). 
84 High Court of Justice 243/62, Ulpanei Hassrata BeIsrael Ltd. v. Levi Geri (10 December 
1962). 
85 This of course touches upon the theoretical questions of whether or not speech is 
unique and deserving of special protection from proscription, what it is that makes speech 
different from conduct, and whether expressive conduct ought to be equally protected. See, 
for example, F. SCHAUER, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, in Emory Law 
Journal, 2/2015, p. 426 ss. See also Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907); Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 
(1974); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Herein we shall assume that expressive conduct 
is constitutionally equivalent to speech. 
86 Crimes for which this is required by law include those in Chapter Seven of Part II of 
the Penal Law, e.g. those in fn. 129. See Penal Law, available at fn. 46, Section 123; Section 
135(a). And see, supra, Chapter Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. - Sedition. 
87 Attorney General Directive 4.1004 - Prior Authorization to Submit Indictment, Section 
2(c). 
 97 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 33 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
The Attorney General’s caution in administering the law was 
expressed very clearly in a prominent case of verbally insulting the flag in 
1996, in which no charges were pressed. A Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem 
called the flag ‘a rag on a pole’ in an interview on national radio. A 
concerned citizen urged the Attorney General to open a criminal 
investigation into the matter and press charges. The Attorney general’s 
response is very telling:  
 
“The prosecution acts with much restraint and extreme caution about 
initiating criminal proceedings for crimes whose prosecution entails an 
intrusion on freedom of speech. The statement in question is appalling, 
as the flag is our national symbol, cherished by all who cherish the 
State, but freedom of expression includes the freedom to express views 
which the public loathes. Though prosecution for violating the flag law 
is possible, the supreme status of freedom of expression in our legal 
system is definitely a relevant factor when the prosecution considers 
whether to indict. There is no public interest in pressing charges, 
especially since the Deputy Mayor sent a letter the Mayor in wake of 
the public backlash to his statements, in which he apologized. The 
public interest is better served by removing the affair off the public 
agenda than by an investigation or a prosecution, which will cause 
further public turmoil for no purpose (emphases added)”. 
 
A petition filed by the same individual to the Supreme Court against 
the Attorney General’s decision was rejected by a three judge panel88. 
It is noteworthy that although no charges were pressed in the case 
for the reasons described, as a matter of principle neither the Attorney 
General nor the Supreme Court raised any objection to the application of 
the law in cases where the flag is not physically desecrated but merely 
derided verbally, and agreed that a criminal offense had in fact been 
committed. This is surprising for several reasons, all of which were 
                                                          
88 High Court of Justice 8507/96, Theodor Orin v. State of Israel (7 January 1997). While 
the court’s decision not to overrule the Attorney General was unanimous, there was a 
difference in the Justice's opinions. Justice Eliyahu Matza, stressed the reasonableness of 
the Attorney General’s decision, with Chief Justice Aharon Barak concurring, while justice 
Mishael Cheshin penned a separate opinion, elaborated on the criminality of affronting the 
flag and the insincerity of the apology. It is of interest to note that Cheshin was the 
Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset, that disqualified 
Cherut’s campaign jingle discussed below. The additional justices, Barak and Matza, were 
also on the panel that upheld Cheshin’s disqualification. See fn. 124. In that case, Chief 
Justice Barak was in the minority, finding Cheshin’s disqualification incorrect and falling 
outside the “zone of reasonableness” in which the court should intervene and overrule his 
decision, with justices Matza and Tova Strassberg-Cohen finding Cheshin’s decision 
correct. 
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apparently overlooked by the Attorney General and the court in their 
written analyses of the case. 
First, at the very core of the democratically paramount principle of 
freedom of speech is the protection of opinions. The criminalization of 
ideational speech is much harder to justify from a constitutional perspective 
than the criminalization of acts that go beyond what is essential to the 
ideational message of the opinion they seek to express. If one is not allowed 
to burn the flag, he may still otherwise express his opinions about the value 
of the flag, about the state which it represents, about its citizens and about 
what he hopes and wishes for them89. Therefore, there may be valid reasons 
that justify prohibiting the flag’s desecration, as such a prohibition does not 
essentially contradict freedom of expression. But if one is not able to express 
the very opinion that the flag has no intrinsic value, then there is absolutely 
nothing left of freedom of expression, without which there is no democracy. 
Additionally, the official English translation of the law uses the term 
“insult” to the flag. This lends itself to the interpretation that it is inclusive 
of verbal offense more easily, though not decisively. But the actual Hebrew 
term “Pgi’a” may in fact more accurately be translated as injury or damage. 
Thus, the law literally proscribes “injuring the honor of the flag”. This may 
properly be understood as only applying to physical acts that are offensive 
to the flag’s honor, even if not permanently damaging the flag itself90. This 
                                                          
89 See, for example, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), at 603, Justice Rehnquist, 
dissenting; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 397 - 439, at 438- 439, Justice Stevens, 
dissenting. R. C. POST, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First 
Amendment, in California Law Review, 76/1988, p. 297 ss., Part II (rejecting the distinction). 
The distinction between ideational speech and speech that lacks ideational value was also 
made by the European Court of Human Rights in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 
Application no. 13470/87, 20 September 1994, paragraph 49. In addition, see, Council of 
Europe Venice Commission, Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a 
Democratic Society, Science and Technique of Democracy Series, No. 47, March 2010, at 27, 
paragraph 61. See also, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) at 25. This same distinction, 
rejected in Cohen, was asserted approvingly in: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942), at 571 - 572; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) at 309 - 310. 
90 E.g., such was the case in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974);Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405 (1974). In Smith, given in March 1974, Valarie Goguen was sentenced to six 
months’ imprisonment for sewing a small flag to the seat of his pants. In Spence, Harold 
Omand Spence was sentenced, first to 90 days’ imprisonment with 60 days suspended by 
a local court and then to 10 days’ suspended imprisonment and a fine of $75 by a jury in 
Superior Court, for hanging an American flag upside down, with peace symbols made out 
of removable tape affixed to it on both sides, to protest the killing of four protesters against 
the war in Vietnam at Kent State University in 1970. Both convictions were reversed by the 
Supreme Court. Given in March 1974, a decade and a half before the cases of Johnson and 
Eichman that permitted flag burning outright, the 6-3 majority in Smith relied on vagueness 
and overbreadth. In Spence, given three months later, the per curiam majority opinion of 
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interpretation, less constitutionally challenging as well as more accurate, 
could have gone a long way in diffusing the constitutional tension inherent 
in the law. 
Another problem with an indictment in this case, is that the 
statement in question does not actually insult the Israeli flag. The statement 
was indeed directed at the Israeli flag, the full statement being that “the flag 
is no more than an expression of a stick with a blue-and-white rag on it”. 
When taken in context however, it is questionable, at the very least, whether 
the speaker actually had any intention of insulting the Israeli flag per se. 
Essentially, the statement relates to flags in general, to all flags and any flag, 
not particularly to the Israeli flag. The speaker was trying to express the 
opinion, clearly not very prudently or effectively, that standing a moment 
of silence or waving a flag lack any inherent spiritual value, as opposed to 
saying a prayer. Had the speaker expressed this opinion more cautiously 
and politely, he could hardly have been accused of insult towards flags, let 
alone the Israeli flag specifically. Hence, it is quite questionable whether his 
unfortunate choice of words is enough to turn his statement into an insult 
and injury to the Israeli flag. 
A search in the legal databases yields no more than a handful of 
criminal convictions for flag desecration, the earliest of them going back to 
2007. In none of the cases was there a sentence of actual imprisonment 
imposed, with the prosecution not even demanding such in all the cases but 
one91, nor was a fine imposed. There are also two criminal cases on other 
charges in which earlier convictions for flag desecration are mentioned92, 
one acquittal93, and two arrests which were apparently not further 
                                                          
six justices (five of the six in Smith) based their decision on the fact that Spence owned the 
flag, displayed it on private property, did not inflict permanent damage to the flag and 
community peace had not been disturbed. 
91 We also learn from an old newspaper report that two Arab men that tore the flag on 
Independence Day of 1968 in Kfar Kanne, an Arab village in the Galilee, were sentenced 
by an Arab judge in the Nazareth Peace Court to 3 months’ imprisonment and a fine of 500 
pounds. See, “Imprisonment for Two Young Arabs that Tore the Flag on Independence 
Day”, Ma’ariv, 1 October 1968.  
92 See, Criminal Case (Nazareth Peace Court) 1279/02, State of Israel v. Adnan Ben 
Muhammad Salman (5 November 2003), mention of earlier conviction for flag desecration; 
Miscellaneous Petitions (Kfar-Saba Peace Court) 3675/09 (Criminal Case 1815/09), State of 
Israel v. Salem Salame (23 June 2009), mention of a conviction in 1982 for violation the Flag 
and Emblem Regulations. 
93 See, Criminal Case (Jerusalem Peace Court) 4295/00, State of Israel v. Slaime Tarek (19 
March 2001), acquittal due to insufficient evidence. 
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prosecuted94, as well as cases reported in the press that have not been 
prosecuted95. 
This dearth of indictments, almost all of which were in cases that 
received much publicity and could not be overlooked, taken together with 
the Attorney General’s directive and his refusal to prosecute in the Orin case 
and response to Mr. Orin, and the relatively mild sentencing in cases that 
were prosecuted, give a distinct impression of uneasiness with the law, and 
a reluctance and hesitation to implement it strictly and rigorously. 
There have not yet been any flag desecration indictments since the 
Flag Law’s recent amendment96, in which the maximum penalty of 
imprisonment was tripled and the maximum fine doubled. In light of the 
unease with the law and cautious prosecution described above, and the 
mild sentencing as detailed below, it remains to be seen whether this 
legislative amendment will have any significant affect upon the prosecutive 
and penal policy of the Attorney General’s office and the courts. Such is a 
possibility that seems quite unlikely to this writer, barring a fundamental 
paradigmatic shift about the constitutional validity of a flag-desecration 
statute limiting freedom of expression. 
Following is a description of the five criminal cases on record, and a 
discussion of some legal issues addressed in one of them. 
The first case is that of a man that burned a flag at a rally in August 
2007, together with a juvenile accomplice. In November 2009 he was 
convicted and sentenced to a suspended prison term of six months for a 
probation period of three years. He was also ordered to sign a Good 
Behavior Bond97, in which he obligates himself not to commit any of the 
offenses in the Flag Law for a period of three years, in the sum of 3,000 NIS, 
or 15 days’ imprisonment instead98. The prosecution had requested an 
                                                          
94 See, Arrest (Tel Aviv - Jaffa Peace Court) 50156-05-11, State of Israel v. Daniel Karmon 
(28 May 2011), released on bail; Miscellaneous Criminal Petitions (Supreme Court) 
8418/12, John Doe (not one of the defendants in the criminal cases detailed below) v. State 
of Israel (20 November 2012), arrest for desecrating the flag. 
95 See, e.g., Rebecca Anna Stoil, “’Satanist’ Teens Allegedly Burn Flag”, The Jerusalem 
Post, January 30, 2007.  
96 Several cases of flag desecration that have been reported in recent years, have not 
yielded indictments thus far. In this context, allegations of selective enforcement are 
sometimes made in the press. See, for example, Yif’at Ehrlich, “Blue Flag Whereto?”, 
Yedi’ot Acharonot, 8 December 2016. 
97 See (available at fn. 46) Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part One: General Provisions, Chapter 
Six: Modes of Punishment, Article Five: Recognizance to Abstain from Offence, Section 72 
- Recognizance by Sentenced Person to Abstain from Offence.  
98 Criminal Case (Akko Peace Court) 13240-01-09, State of Israel v. Mahammud Hoseri (18 
November 2009). 
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unspecified suspended sentence, along with a fine99. The defendant's 
confession, clear criminal record and additional personal circumstances 
contributed to his mild sentence. The juvenile was sentenced to community 
service without conviction, as well as signing a Good Behavior Bond100. 
The next case is that of a man charged with rioting and desecration 
of the flag, which he publicly burned and trampled on the eve of Memorial 
Day, in April 2010. He was convicted and sentenced in December 2012, in a 
plea bargain, to 120 hours of community service101. The case itself is typical. 
The sentence is mild, in line with the leniency generally shown in such cases 
by the prosecution and by the courts. But an earlier decision of Judge Dov 
Pollock, given about preliminary arguments submitted by the defense, 
draws special attention because of its importance for our theoretical inquiry 
into the burning of national and religious artifacts. 
First, the defense argued that the law is in fact a dead letter which 
isn’t implemented, and that countless law abiding and patriotic citizens 
would become criminals if it were to be implemented. This being the case 
because the law doesn’t require any malice, and thousands of flags are 
inadvertently desecrated and trampled after celebrations, flown when torn 
or dirty102, and manufactured and used by organizations and individuals in 
ways that do not comply with the law103, such as with altered colors, 
together with slogans and on clothing and various products and 
merchandise. 
Pollock dismissed this argument, though conceding that there are 
many cases, which he calls “marginal” although they are in fact quite clear 
cut as per the letter of the law, where indictment would be unjustified 
despite the letter of the law. The judge postulates that this, as well as 
freedom of speech considerations, are the reason for the Attorney General’s 
directive requiring his approval prior to indictment104. He concludes that 
the existence of such cases does not warrant eliminating the law’s 
                                                          
99 Ibidem, paragraph 4. 
100 The details of the accomplice’s sentence are based on references from Hosseri’s 
sentencing decision, and are therefore incomplete. 
101 Criminal Case (Jerusalem Peace Court) 42062-04-10, State of Israel v. Yechiel Chazan 
(17 May 2011). 
102 See, Flag Regulations, Section 1(a)(2), supra Section 2.3. - The Flag and Emblem 
Regulations. 
103 Ibidem, Section 1(a)(1). 
104 See supra, Section 3.1. - Attorney General. 
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implementation entirely, even in cases where the offense is clearly contrary 
to the spirit of the law105. 
More significant for our purposes, the defense directly attacked the 
constitutional validity of the law, as being fundamentally contrary to the 
principle of free speech. Echoing the American paradigm of freedom of 
speech trumping protection of the flag and citing Texas v. Johnson106, the 
defense maintained that freedom of expression should be protected in a 
democracy even when it is abusive, offensive and outrageous, and should 
overcome the desire to safeguard public sensibilities. The defense 
contended that the law was archaic and should be revisited in light of Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 
In the relatively short decision, the judge rejects this view. While not 
elaborating and substantiating his approach107, he equates flag desecration 
to the desecration of religious symbols and books, comparing both to a 
copyright or trademark. He thus sees the flag as the intellectual property of 
the collectivity of the nation. Since the flag “belongs” to the citizens of the 
state, the state may protect it from abuse and proscribe its desecration, even 
when its tangible ownership belongs to the desecrator. 
Though Pollock calls his approach novel, the recognition of the deep 
emotional connection of citizens to their flag, the fundamental insight that 
national symbols rightly belong collectively to the nation, and the intuition 
that these ought to be protectable analogously to copyright, have in fact 
already been expressed in the minority opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court 
flag-desecration cases108. 
The novelty of the decision may be in the parallel that he draws 
between flags as national symbols, and religious books and symbols. 
However, Pollock sees religious books and symbols as belonging to 
humanity at large: "It may be asserted that the Jewish bible and the Talmud, 
the Koran and the Christian holy texts belong to all of humanity, as well as 
the symbols of the various religions". Under more rigorous analysis, 
though, it seems that this conception is in fact counterproductive to his 
purpose. If religious books indeed "belonged" to everyone, a single state 
would not have the authority to proscribe their desecration. On the 
                                                          
105 On the rejection of this argument see also, Criminal Case (Jerusalem) 5224-07-12, State 
of Israel v. Ersterovitz, (11 December 2014). 
106 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
107 For example, such substantiation is found in the law itself, which prohibits 
unauthorized production and use of the flag. 
108 See, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), at 587, Justice White, concurring in 
judgement (quoted in Johnson, 434), at 602 - 604, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting; Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), at 438- 439, Justice Stevens, dissenting. 
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contrary, that would make them part of the public domain, which is 
available for all to use and exploit without restriction109. That is precisely 
what could permit hostile adherents of one religion to freely desecrate the 
books sacred to their opponents. 
Rather, the proper analogy would be to say that the religious books 
of each religion are the intellectual property of the collectivity of the specific 
Religion's adherents, just as flags belong to the collectivity of the nation. The 
“citizens” of Religions naturally have the right to proscribe the desecration 
of their collective intellectual property. Therefore, states are justified in 
protecting such property from abuse. 
Of course, this approach raises many questions and possible 
objections. The contours of what may rightly be considered intellectual 
property created by the collectivity and therefore rightly belonging to it and 
protected from abuse, and what is merely imagery that represents the 
collective but does not “belong” to it, are not clearly defined. The scope of 
the protection this conception should provide is also difficult to delineate. 
A thorough discussion of these issues is well beyond the scope of this work. 
Nevertheless, the core paradigm of seeing flags, national symbols, religious 
books and religious artifacts as morally belonging to their collective 
originators, is a compelling articulation of the prevalent intuition that they 
should be protected from abuse. This can explain why these should be 
treated exceptionally, and excluded from the broad scope of the protection 
that must normally be afforded to freedom of expression and expressive 
conduct. 
This case, which occurred in the spring of 2012 and was sentenced 
three years later in April 2015, included multiple counts of trespass into 
memorial sites, painting hateful graffiti on monuments and damaging 
property, as well as desecrating the flag by burning the flag-rope thus 
causing it to fall to the ground. In a partial plea bargain, the defendant was 
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment to be served by community 
service110, as well as a suspended term of three months’ imprisonment on 
                                                          
109 See, World Intellectual Property Organization, Glossary of Key Terms Related to 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional 
Cultural Expressions, July 5, 2018.  
110 In the Israeli penal system, there is a distinction between a sentence of community 
service, as was given in the Chazan case, and a sentence of imprisonment served as 
community service, as given in this case. In the latter case the service is performed during 
the regular work day, which precludes commercial employment, and under the 
supervision of the Prison Service, which can commute the sentence to actual imprisonment 
if the “prisoner” doesn’t properly perform his community service. A sentence of 
community service can also be given without a conviction, in which case the defendant is 
not burdened with a criminal record. See, text accompanying fn. Errore. Il segnalibro non 
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probation for all of the counts of the conviction, for a period of three 
years111. The prosecution had only demanded a sentence of six month’s 
imprisonment to be served by community service112, yet the judge issued a 
harsher sentence by adding the additional suspended sentence of three 
months. 
The lower court’s conviction was appealed to the District Court on 
free speech grounds. The District Court upheld the conviction and the 
sentence113. A petition to appeal the constitutional question to the Supreme 
Court was denied114. 
We find the next conviction in a case that occurred on Independence 
Day in early May 2014 and was sentenced in July 2016. A drunken man 
stabbed a flag on display in the street several times with a big knife. He was 
charged and convicted for desecrating the flag, as well as possession of the 
knife. The defendant already had three prior convictions: two counts of 
absence without leave from military duty, from 2004 and 2005, for which he 
had served sentences of 70 and 75 days’ imprisonment; and one count of 
possession of a knife for an improper purpose from 2013, for which he 
received a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment, for a period of 
three years. Since the offender repeated the same crime within the three 
years of his suspended sentence, he should normally have been imprisoned 
for the six months he was to which he was sentenced. The prosecution 
requested a combined sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment to be actually 
served115, for both the previous suspended sentence and the current 
conviction116. 
Despite all of the above, the judge was wary of impairing the 
rehabilitation process which the defendant had begun, and therefore did 
not sentence him to serve any actual time in prison. Instead, he sentenced 
him to a suspended prison term of five months’, for a probation period of 
three years, while further postponing the execution of the previous 
                                                          
è definito.. 
111 Criminal Case (Jerusalem Peace Court) 5224-07-12 State of Israel v. Esterovitz (2 April 
2015). 
112 Ibidem, paragraph 3. 
113 Criminal Appeal (Jerusalem District Court) 31749-05-15, Esterovitz v. State of Israel (17 
December 2015). 
114 Petition to Appeal (Supreme Court) 797/16, Esterovitz v. State of Israel (14 December 
2016). 
115 This is the only case in which the prosecution demanded actual imprisonment. 
116 Criminal Case (Petach-Tikvah Peace Court) 9220-05-14, State of Israel v. Gai Ando 
Chaim Baruch (17 July 2016), paragraph 3. 
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suspended prison term of six months, and extending the probation period 
for two more years117. He was also sentenced to pay 1,500 NIS, for violating 
a Good Behavior Bond he had previously signed, in five monthly 
installments118. 
This case occurred several days before the Baruch case, but was 
sentenced in June 2017. Shortly before Memorial Day for fallen soldiers and 
Independence Day, when the streets are regularly decorated with flags, a 
Jewish woman and a Christian Arab man conspired to desecrate Israeli flags 
in the mixed city of Jaffa, by spraying them with red paint in the pre-dawn 
hours of the night. Belonging to an anarchistic group, they were under 
police surveillance119, and were caught after spraying two flags. 
Though the woman’s role in the crime was greater, the man also tried 
to escape and resisted arrest, thus accruing him two additional criminal 
charges. Tried separately, they were both convicted. The woman had been 
sentenced to a suspended prison term of five months and a fine of 3,000 
NIS120. The prosecution requested that the defendant be given a sentence 
equal to that of the woman121. The court sentenced the man to a lighter 
sentence of a suspended prison term of three months for a probation period 
of three years, as well as a fine of 2,000 NIS, to be paid in four monthly 
installments, or 15 days imprisonment instead122.  
Though not criminal proceedings, there were several cases in which 
the Flag Law’s prohibition of desecrating national symbols was invoked to 
restrain freedom of expression in political campaigning. Unlike the criminal 
cases discussed earlier, which were decided by the lower courts, these were 
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. 
In the election cycle of 2003 for the sixteenth Knesset, the right-wing 
Cherut party produced an election jingle in which the tune of the national 
anthem is accompanied by words in Arabic praising terrorism and 
Palestinian terror organizations and calling for the ouster of Jews from "holy 
Palestine". The visual version of the same includes the flag of Israel flying 
                                                          
117 See (available at fn. 46) Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part One: General Provisions, Chapter 
Six: Modes of Punishment, Article Three: Conditional Imprisonment, Section 56(a) - 
Extension of Period of Suspension. 
118 Ibidem, paragraph 25. 
119 Miscellaneous Criminal Petitions (Supreme Court) 3480/15, John Doe v. State of Israel 
(11 June 2015) 
120 The details of the woman's sentence are based on references from Amsis' sentencing 
decision, and are therefore incomplete. 
121 Ibidem, paragraph 12. 
122 Criminal Case (Tel-Aviv Peace Court) 11125-05-14, State of Israel v. Adel Amsis (14 July 
2017). 
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over the Knesset, gradually turning into a Palestinian flag. The Chairman 
of the Central Elections Committee, a position held each election cycle by 
one of the justices of the Supreme Court, used his legal authority over radio 
and television election broadcasts to disqualify both segments. The 
chairman explained his decision by writing that they contain “a display of 
contempt towards the national anthem and a desecration of it - contempt 
and desecration which lead to provocation and even incitement”, inter alia 
citing section 5 of the Flag Law123. The decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, as abridging freedom of speech. 
The court upheld the disqualification, in a two to one decision124.  
Ten years and three election cycles later, an election campaign jingle 
for the left-wing Balad party, depicting right-wing Jewish Members of 
Knesset singing the words of the national anthem to the tune of a popular 
Arab melody, was similarly disqualified. This decision too was appealed to 
the Supreme Court. In this case, a five-seat panel unanimously overruled 
the disqualification, distinguishing it from the Cherut case as less offensive 
to the public, inter alia because it includes no use of the flag125. 
 
 
4 - Foreign Flags 
 
While just until several years ago the maximum penalty prescribed in 
Israel’s Flag Law for desecrating the state flag was imprisonment for one 
year, the punishment assigned in Israel’s Penal Law of 1977 (heretofore: the 
Penal Law) for the crime of insulting flags of friendly foreign states has 
always been imprisonment for three years. The prohibiting clause states126: 
                                                          
123 The National Anthem, the law actually does not apply or refer to the anthem’s tune, 
but only to its lyrics. 
In 2009, a petition to the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the 18th 
Knesset to ban the use of the national anthem in political campaigning completely, as well 
as the use of the anthem’s name “Hatikvah” (The Hope) as the name of a political party, 
was rejected. Knesset Election Committee Petition 5/18, Loui Lipsky v. Kadima (27 January 
2009). 
124 High Court of Justice 212/03, Cherut - The National Jewish Movement v. Justice Mishael 
Cheshin, Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset (16 January 
2003). See also, the Supreme Court’s decision of one week later, to overrule the Chairman’s 
disqualification of two Arab parties’ use of a Palestinian flag in their election broadcasts. 
High Court of Justice 651/03, Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central 
Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset (23 January 2003). 
125 High Court of Justice 246/13, MK Jamal Zachalka v. Chairman of the Central Election 
Committee (15 January 2013). See paragraph 24. 
126 Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part Two: Offences, Chapter Eight: Offences Against the 
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“A person who publicly pulls down, destroys or does any act to injure the 
flag or emblem of a friendly state with intent to show hostility or contempt 
for such state is liable to imprisonment for three years”. 
While on the one hand the maximal punishment for this offence is 
harsher than that of the Flag Law127, and it also does not include a fine, there 
are additional differences between the components of this prohibition and 
those of the desecration clause of the Flag Law, which mitigate its purview. 
First, it is clear from the clause’s language that the offence only 
applies to an act, to the exclusion of any verbal affront, whereas this is not 
evidently the case regarding the Flag Law. Second, the offence’s 
applicability is limited to acts committed in public, whereas the Flag Law 
includes no such limiting factor. Finally, the offence requires intent to show 
hostility or contempt towards the foreign state, whereas the Flag Law 
requires no such malice towards the state when desecrating the flag. 
These additional differences are quite compatible with the different 
rationales of the two prohibitions, despite their outward similarity. 
Whereas the Flag Law criminalizes the desecration of that which is of 
inherent value to the nation, legally embodied in the state as the prohibiting 
sovereign, the Penal Law is here criminalizing the insult of foreign flags and 
emblems, which lack any inherent value to the state. 
The state prohibits insulting the flags and emblems of friendly 
foreign states not in the interest of protecting an object of inherent moral 
value, but in the interest of protecting its diplomatic relations and security. 
This is evident from the location of this clause, in the article that deals with 
offences against foreign states, which is located within the chapter that 
deals with offences against the political and social order. The said article 
includes three similar offences128: Violence Against a Foreign State, 
                                                          
Political and Social Order, Article Five: Offences Against a Foreign State, Section 167 - 
Insult to Flag or Emblem of Friendly State. Available at, fn. 46. 
127 Though the section’s language, unlike that of the Flag Law, does not explicate that 
the punishment is for a period of up to three years that is in fact the case. See Penal Law 
5737 - 1977, Part One: General Provisions, Chapter Six: Modes of Punishment, Article One: 
General, Section 35 - Penalties to be Maximum Penalties. 
128 Sections 165, 166 and 168, respectively. In all of the four prohibitions in this article, 
publicity and intent are required components, besides for the disparagement of foreign 
personalities where intent is only required to aggravate the offence and increase the 
punishment from a fine of 1500 Pounds to imprisonment for three years. Whereas the 
prohibitions of violence against a foreign state and disparagement of foreign personalities 
are not limited to friendly states, incitement to hostilities and insult to a flag and emblem 
are. The reason for this difference, or for the ordering of the four sections is not entirely 
clear. Perhaps violence and disparagement are seen as more seriously damaging than 
incitement and insult, and therefore problematic even when directed at unfriendly states. 
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Incitement to Hostilities Against a Friendly State and Disparagement of 
Foreign Personalities129.  
As the rationale for this offence being diplomatic in nature, it is clear 
why the offence only applies to flags and emblems of friendly states130, and 
why verbal affronts, as well as private or unintentional ones are not 
included, as opposed to the protection of the state flag and emblem Quite 
understandably, the state simply has no interest in protecting foreign flags 
to the same degree that it does its own. Obviously, though, this cannot 
explain the discrepancy in punishment between these two prohibitions. On 
the contrary, considering the different interests they are meant to protect, 
desecrating the state flag ought to be punished more severely than insulting 
a foreign one. 
There are states that do not prohibit the desecration of their own flag 
although they do prohibit desecrating foreign flags. This is the case in 
Denmark131, for example. This however is quite different than punishing 
                                                          
129 It should be noted that the Penal Law includes another prohibition of a similar 
nature, in Chapter Seven - State Security, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets, Article Six 
- Impairment of Foreign Relations, Section 121 - Impairment of Foreign Relations: 
(a) A person who conspires to commit an act against a friendly state or its 
representatives or against an organization or agency of states or its representatives, such 
acts being calculated to prejudice an interest, which Israel has in maintaining relations with 
such state, organization, or agency, is liable to imprisonment for seven years. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, a person who commits an offence with 
intent to damage relations between Israel and any state, organization or agency referred to 
in subsection (a), or an interest which Israel has in maintaining such relations, is liable to 
imprisonment for ten years; but if even without proof of the intent referred to in this 
subsection, the penalty for the offence would be imprisonment for seven years or more, ha 
shall be liable to imprisonment for life. 
(c) In this section, "friendly state" means a state, which maintains diplomatic or trade 
relations with Israel or permits Israeli nationals to visit its territory. 
This article contains one additional section, Section 122 - Enlistment in Foreign Forces. 
These clauses did not originate in the Mandatory Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936, see 
infra, but in the Israeli Penal Law (State Security, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets) 
5717 - 1957 (heretofore: State Security Law) as did all 43 sections of this chapter (though 
many of them predate it, see Section 42 of the State Security Law). "Book of Laws" 235 (9 
August 1957) pp. 172 - 178. See official English translation, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 
11, 5717 - 1956/57, pp. 186 - 195. There is no record to be found in public databases of a 
prosecution for section 121. (As for Section 122 see, Criminal Case 4439/04 (Jerusalem 
peace Court) State of Israel v. Abu Zayad Ziyad (5 March 2006).) 
130 The definition of a friendly state is not provided in this article, or in the Criminal 
Code Ordinance of 1936, and see fn. 129. 
131 See, Straffeloven (Penal Law), Chapter 12 - Crimes Against the State’s Independence 
and Security, Section 110e: Any person who publicly insults any foreign nation, foreign 
state, its flag or any other recognized symbol of nationality, or the flag of the United 
Nations or the Council of Europe, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not 
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less harshly for insulting the national flag than for doing so to a foreign flag. 
A state may decide it does not wish to criminalize the desecration of its own 
flag, thus waiving the right to enforce the respect that ought to be afforded 
to the state flag as a symbol of national identity and sovereignty, for 
ideological or practical reasons. It may consider it wiser to let dissidents “let 
off steam” by burning the national flag than to grace and enhance their 
dissent by prosecuting them, for example. At the same time, the state may 
wish to prohibit such insult towards other countries, for the reasons 
described above. This may be unusual, but it is not contradictory. It seems 
patently discordant, however, for a state to consider the desecration of its 
                                                          
exceeding two years. With a similar intention of protecting foreign relations, Section 110d 
increases the criminal penalties for defamation committed against heads of foreign states 
or diplomatic missions. It is noteworthy in this context that law of the Faroe Islands, which 
are part of the Kingdom of Denmark, does prohibit desecration of their flag, by words or 
deeds, punishable by an unspecified fine. See, “Løgtingslóg no. 42 frá 17. juli 1959 um 
flaggið, sum broytt við løgtingslóg nr. 109 frá 29. desember 1998”. The law also specifies 
the flag’s colors and dimensions, which may not be altered; prohibits its marking; instructs 
how and when it be flown; and prohibits its use to identify persons companies or 
institutions, as well as for marketing products not produced in the Faroe Islands. 
See also, Starffeloven, Chapter 15 - Crimes Against Public Order and Peace, Section 139, 
which penalizes the violation of cemeteries and corpses, or objects belonging to a church 
and used for religious purposes, punishable by a fine or up to six months’ imprisonment; 
and Section 140, which penalizes public blaspheme or ridicule of the doctrines or worship 
of any lawfully existing religious community, punishable by a fine or up to four months’ 
imprisonment. Chapter 27 - Crimes Against Personal Rights and Defamation, Section 266b, 
which penalizes publicly threatening, insulting or degrading groups of people based on 
race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual orientation, punishable by a fine or 
up to two years’ imprisonment. This section was added to the Straffeloven in 1971, upon 
Denmark’s ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. See, Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Blasphemy, Insult and 
Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic Society (heretofore: Blasphemy), Science and 
Technique of Democracy Series, No. 47, March 2010, 163. For a discussion of these clauses, 
their historical background, jurisprudence and implementation see, op. cit., 246 - 260. While 
it is not immediately clear to this author that burning the Koran necessarily violates section 
140 as blasphemy (or section 266b, as hate speech), such was in fact recently prosecuted 
under this clause. See, Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Danish Man Who Burned Quran Is 
Prosecuted for Blasphemy”, The New York Times, Februay 23, 2017. It should be noted in 
this context that this clause was used only a handful of times since its enactment in 1866, 
the most recent conviction being in 1946. The sole indictment after that was in 1971, for a 
song mocking Christianity broadcast on National radio, was acquitted. See, Blasphemy, p. 
253. It is noteworthy as well that these clauses were considered and dismissed by the 
prosecution authorities in the famous Danish Muhammad Cartoons case in 2005. On this 
matter, see also, M. GATTI, Blasphemy in European Law, in (edited by M. DÍEZ-BOSCH, J. 
SÀNCHEZ-TORRENTS), On Blasphemy, Universitat Ramon Llull Press, Blanquerna, 2015, p. 49 
ss. 
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flag a crime worth prosecuting yet punish those doing so less harshly than 
those desecrating foreign flags. 
Rather, this oddity is apparently an oversight which occurred at 
some phase of the legislative history of these two prohibitions. To shed 
further light on this matter, we must look back at the penal legislation that 
existed in Israel prior to the enactment of the Penal Law and Flag Law by 
the Knesset. 
The Israeli Penal Law was drafted as an integrated version of the 
British Mandatory Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 (heretofore: the 
Criminal Code Ordinance or the Ordinance)132, and the numerous 
amendments it underwent during the British Mandate and after the 
establishment of the state, thus replacing it133. The Ordinance was based on 
the Queensland Criminal Code Act of 1899 (heretofore: the Queensland 
Code)134, which was used by the Colonial Office in many parts of the British 
Empire, including in Cyprus in 1928135, from where it was directly imported 
in 1936136. 
                                                          
132 The Ordinance replaced the Ottoman Penal Code previously in force, with 
Mandatory Amendments. For a background and description of the Ordinance see, N. 
BENTWICH, The New Criminal Code for Palestine, in Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law, 1/1938, p. 71 ss. (Norman Bentwich was the Attorney General of the 
Mandatory Government until 1930). The Bill of the Ordinance was first published in the 
Mandatory Government’s official gazette, The Palestine Gazette, No. 367, 6th June 1933, p. 40 
(on blue paper, as customary for Bills). It was republished again in Palestine Gazette No. 
633, 28th September 1936, p. 973 ss., presumably due to the long period of time between its 
first publication and the actual enactment of the Ordinance. The Ordinance was adopted 
and published in a special edition of the gazette, Palestine Gazette No. 652, Supplement No. 
1, Criminal Code Ordinance 1936, 14th December 1936, at 40. (“Supplement No. 1” of the 
Palestine Gazette is where Ordinances where published between 1934 and 1948.) See also, 
The Israel State Archives, Criminal Code Ordinance 1936 - Palestine Gazette 1933, ISA-
MandatoryOrganizations-MandateAtrnGen-000v07o. 
133 See, Penal Law p. 4. Both the Ordinance and the Penal Law are divided into two 
parts, the first containing general provisions and the second specific offences. The 
Ordinance contains 44 chapters that are numbered in sequence through both parts. The 
second part, which begins with Chapter VIII, is further divided into eight divisions. The 
Penal Law consists of 15 chapters also sequentially ordered through both parts, with most 
of the chapters in the second part, which begins with Chapter Seven, further divided into 
articles, numbered separately in every chapter. The Ordinance contained 391 sections, 
whereas the Penal Law contains over 500. 
134 The Criminal Code Act, 1899, p. 6825 ss. The Queensland Code contains 707 sections 
and is 270 pages long, including 30 pages of appendices.  
135 The Cyprus Criminal Code, Order in Council, 1928, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 1947, 17th 
October 1928, p. 695 ss.  
136 See, N. ABRAMS, Interpreting the Criminal Code Ordinance. The Untapped Well, in Israel 
Law Review, 7/1936, p. 25 ss.; Y. SHACHAR, The Origins of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 
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The Queensland Code was based on James Fitzjames Stephen's Draft 
Criminal Code of 1878. The Draft Code, billed in Parliament in 1879, failed 
with the fall of D'Israeli's government in 1880. However, Stephen's Draft 
Code influenced codifications throughout the British Commonwealth, 
beginning with Canada in 1892137, New Zealand in 1893138, Queensland in 
1899, as well as other parts of Australia later on139. 
The four sections of this article in the Penal Law are from Sections 
67(1), 67(2), 68 and 77 of the Criminal Code Ordinance140. In fact, the 
                                                          
1936, in Tel Aviv University Law Review (Iyunei Mishpat), 1/1979, p. 75 ss. It is noteworthy, 
however, that of the four sections in this article in the Penal Law and the Criminal Code 
Ordinance, only one has its origin in the Queensland Code, the other three being absent 
from the Canadian and New Zealand codes, as well. See, Queensland Criminal Code, Part 
II - Offences Against Public Order, Chapter VII - Sedition, Section 53 - Defamation of 
Foreign Princes, the last section of the chapter after nine sections dealing with sedition 
proper, which is very similar to Section 77 of the Ordinance and Section 168 of the Penal 
Law. The only material difference is that the penalty for prescribed for this offence in the 
Queensland Code is two years' imprisonment, rather than three. The same offence in the 
Canadian and New Zealand Codes carries a penalty of one years' imprisonment. See, The 
Canadian Criminal Code, 1892 (available at, fn. 137) Title II - Offences Against Public 
Order, Internal and External, Part VII - Seditious Offences, Section 125 - Libels on Foreign 
Sovereigns; New Zealand Criminal Code 1893 (available at, fn. 138) Title II - Offences 
Against Public Order, Internal and External, Part VII - Seditious Offences, Section 103 - 
Libels on Sovereigns of Foreign States.  
137 The Criminal Code, 1892, 55 - 56 Victoria, Chapter 29. The Code contains 983 sections 
and is 403 pages long, including 91 pages of appendices. 
138 New Zealand Criminal Code, 1893, 57 Victoria No. 56. The code contains 424 sections 
and is 106 pages long, including 6 pages of appendices. 
139 See, J. D. HEYDON, Reflections on James Fitzjames Stephen, in University of Queensland 
Law Journal, 29/2010, p. 43 ss.; M.L. FRIEDLAND, R.S. Wright's Model Criminal Code: A 
Forgotten Chapter in the History of the Criminal Law, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 3/1981) 
p. 307 ss.; S. H. KADISH, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, in Columbia 
Law Review, 78/1978, p. 1098 ss. See also, R.A. POSNER, The Romance of Force: James 
Fitzjames Stephen on Criminal Law, in Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 10/2012, p. 263 ss. 
140 Criminal Code Ordinance 1936, Part II - Offences, Division I - Offences Against 
Public Order, Chapter VIII - Treason and Other Offences Against the Authority of the 
Government, Section 67(1) - Attempt to Organise Violent. Attempt Against Constitution of 
Foreign Country; Section 67(2) - Incitement to Hostilities Against Friendly Powers; Section 
68 - Insult to Flag; Chapter X - Offences Affecting Relations with Foreign States and 
External Tranquility, Section 77 - Defamation of Foreign Princes, Etc. Cf. fn. 128, and 
accompanying text. It is quite odd that the first three prohibitions are separate from the 
fourth in the Ordinance and located in Chapter VII, which deals with a long list of crimes 
like treason, and not in Chapter X which deals with offences against foreign states, like 
Article Five of Chapter Eight of the Penal law, wherein they fit more accurately. Chapter X 
contains but one additional section, Section 78 - Piracy (which is a separate article 
containing but one section in the Penal Law - Article Six, Section 169 - identical in language 
to the Ordinance except for the harsher punishment in the Ordinance). This combination 
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language of these four sections in the Criminal Code Ordinance is almost 
identical to that of their parallels in the Penal Law, with only minor 
alterations. The only exception is Section 68 - Insult to the Flag, which has 
two subsections in the ordinance. The second subsection prohibits insulting 
flags and emblems of friendly states, as does the parallel clause in the Penal 
Law, after the first subsection prohibits the same towards flags and 
emblems of Great Britain. 
Of course, this subsection was not included in the Penal Law because 
it became obsolete upon the enactment of the Flag Law141. But because of its 
comparative importance, especially for our immediate purpose, it is 
worthwhile to quote here the full text of the section: 
 
“Any person who: 
(a) publicly pulls down, destroys, or does any act to injure the flag 
or any emblem of Great Britain; or 
(b) publicly pulls down, destroys, or does any act to injure the flag 
or any emblem of any friendly state, with intent to show hatred or 
contempt for such state 
is guilty of a misdemeanour”. 
 
As clarified earlier in the Criminal Code Ordinance, where not 
otherwise prescribed a misdemeanour is liable to imprisonment for three 
years, or to a fine of one hundred pounds, or to both such penalties142. 
                                                          
is present in the Cyprus Code as well. See, Cyprus Criminal Code, Part II - Crimes, Division 
I - Offences Against Public Order, Chapter XI - Offences Affecting Relations with Foreign 
States and External Tranquillity (sic). When considering the legislative history of the 
Ordinance, however, it becomes obvious why this is so. Unlike the other three offences, 
defamation of foreign princes is an offence originating in the Queensland Code, as well its 
Canadian and New Zealand counterparts, see fn. 136. The additional three offences were 
either originally drafted for the Ordinance or patched with it from some later source (they 
are not present in the Cyprus Code), whilst overlooking the similarity to the existing 
offence when deciding on where to locate them. (For a similar oversight of similarity). The 
legislative history of the Ordinance also explains the presence of the offence of piracy in 
the same chapter as defamation of foreign princes. In the Canadian and New Zealand 
codes, piracy is Chapter VIII of Title II, following libel on a foreign sovereign at the end of 
Chapter VII. (In the Queensland Code, piracy is three chapters further away, in Chapter 
XI.) Their proximity in theses codes apparently caused their placing under the same 
chapter in the Ordinance. 
141 The Flag Law ought to have formally repealed Section 68(a) of the Ordinance, but no 
such repeal is included in the act. The clause had no effect though, besides singling out the 
flag and emblem of Great Britain, which would otherwise be included in the prohibition 
of Section 68(b) as those of other friendly countries. 
142 Criminal Code Ordinance 1936, Part I - General Provisions, Chapter VII - 
Punishments, Section 47 - General Punishment for Misdemeanor. 
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We see here that the Ordinance does bring together both 
prohibitions, because of their structural similarity and despite their 
different rationales. However, the punishment for both is equal. But it is 
certainly counterintuitive to punish for the desecration of the state flag more 
leniently than for the desecration of a foreign flag. Additionally, the 
Ordinance also treats the desecration of Great Britain's flag more severely 
than the desecration of a foreign flag. Whereas the former prohibition 
applies regardless of intent, for the latter prohibition to apply there must be 
intent to show hatred or contempt for the foreign state. 
Unlike the four offences against a foreign state in the Penal Law 
mentioned above, the text of the desecration clause in the Flag Law is not 
derived from that of Section 68(a) in the Ordinance. Its language appears to 
be originally drafted, though naturally similar in content. Yet it does 
maintain some similarity to the Ordinance. First, it prohibits desecrating the 
flag as well as the emblem, like the parallel clause in the Ordinance. Second, 
the structure of the punishment is similar to that in the Ordinance, 
imprisonment or a fine or both, and the text of this part of the clause is 
almost identical to that of the Ordinance: liable to imprisonment for … or 
to a fine … or to both such penalties. 
When the Flag Law was drafted in 1949, it was decided that its 
application should not be limited to defiling actions committed in public, 
and so this component was eliminated from the desecration clause. Yet 
concurrently with this more stringent approach to the very prohibition of 
desecrating the state flag, it was also decided that the appropriate maximal 
punishment for such desecration is imprisonment for but one year instead 
of three. Apparently, the penal standard in 1949 was simply more lenient 
than it was in the past. 
In tailoring the Flag Law to the preferences of the Israeli legislature 
of 1949, however, the drafters ignored the disparity between the 
punishment for desecrating the state flag and for desecrating foreign flags. 
It should be noted that the even after the amendment which increased the 
maximum prison term in the Flag Law to three years, this gap has not been 
entirely closed143. Insulting the state flag may still be punished by the more 
                                                          
143 In the opinion of this author, the language of the Flag Law's desecration clause: 
"imprisonment for a term not exceeding imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
years, or to a fine not exceeding (see fn. 51 and accompanying text) or to both such 
penalties", is properly understood as allowing the imposition of a fine only if the sentence 
does not include the maximal imprisonment term of three years. Thus, the maximal penalty 
for is three years' imprisonment, but nor three years plus a fine. If this is not the case, then 
the maximal penalty for flag desecration is greater than the maximal penalty for 
desecrating foreign flags. 
 114 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), fascicolo n. 33 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
lenient penalty of a fine144, whereas the only punishment prescribed for 
insulting a foreign flag is imprisonment, though prison sentences are often 
suspended, thus in fact being lighter than a fine. 
The entire discussion above, however, remains largely hypothetical 
and declaratory in nature. Its practical significance appears highly 
questionable, when considering the case law for insulting foreign flags - or 
any of the offences against a foreign state, for that matter - which is 
practically non-existent. There is but one case available in the databases of 
an indictment for the crime of desecrating a foreign flag, and none for any 
of the other offences in the article of offences against a foreign state. It 
appears that these clauses are anachronistic and have turned into a dead-
letter relic of the past. 
In the case on record, the defendant threw stones at the Egyptian 
consulate in the city of Eilat in the early morning hours of September 4th 
2011. On September 8th, after the police renewed his arrest twice as required 
by law145, and being charged with insulting the flag of a friendly state as 
well as with an attempt to cause damage with malice146, the prosecution 
requested of the court that he be remanded in custody until trail. The 
request was denied by the court, which ordered that he be released on bail 
to home arrest. No further record of the case exists, suggesting that the 
charges were later dropped147. 
 
 
5 - Desecration of Religious Books 
 
Israel’s Penal Law contains two prohibitions which restrict expression for 
the sake of protecting religious sentiment. One of these includes within it 
the desecration of religious books and other objects of veneration. Chapter 
Eight of the Penal Law deals with offences against the political and social 
order. Article Seven of this chapter, which immediately follows the articles 
                                                          
144 It is of interest to note that no fines have been given for flag desecration in recent 
years.  
145 See, Arrest (Eilat Peace Court) 5418-09-11, State of Israel v. David Mekmil (5 September 
2011); Arrest (Eilat Peace Court) 5418-09-11, State of Israel v. David Mekmil (6 September 
2011). In the first arrest request, the suspect is alleged with committing additional offences, 
Driving Under the Influence of alcohol, Impairment of Foreign Relations and "Rock 
Throwing", a military offence. 
146 Penal Law, Section 452. This may also be due to the prosecution's reluctance to indict 
based solely on the prohibition of insulting a foreign flag. 
147 Remand (Be'er Sheva Peace Court) 17373-09-11, State of Israel v. David Mekmil (8 
September 2011). 
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dealing with offences against a foreign state and piracy, contained five 
prohibitions intended to protect against offence to sentiments of religion 
and tradition148. These prohibitions also originated in the Criminal Code 
Ordinance of 1936149, almost verbatim150. 
The first of these five is the prohibition of insult to religion, which 
states151: 
 
“A person who destroys, damages or desecrates a place of worship or 
any object which is held sacred by a group of persons, with the 
intention of thereby reviling their religion or with the knowledge that 
they are likely to consider such destruction, damage or desecration as 
an insult to their religion, is liable to imprisonment for three years”. 
 
Thus, desecrating a religious book or other object venerated by 
members of a religion is a criminal offence. A comparison between this 
clause and the desecration clause in the Flag Law shows that they are 
practically of a similar nature. While flag desecration does not require intent 
                                                          
148 See, Penal Law 5737 - 1977, Part Two: Offences, Chapter Eight: Offences Against the 
Political and Social Order, Article Seven: Offences Against Sentiments of Religion and 
Tradition, Sections 170 - 174. Besides insult to religion and outrage to religious feelings 
discussed below, the other three prohibitions are, Section 171 - Disturbing Worship; Section 
172 - Trespassing on Place of Worship or Burial; and Section 174 - Destroying or Damaging 
Public Buildings or Monuments. And see the Protection of Holy Places Law. Section 174 
was repealed in 2009. See, "Book of Laws" 2213 (3 November 2009) 236.  
149 Criminal Code Ordinance 1936, Part II - Offences, Division III - Offences Injurious to 
the Public in General, Chapter XVI - Offences Relating to Religion and Public Monuments, 
Section 146 - Insult to Religion of any Class; Section 147 - Disturbing Religious Worship; 
Section 148 - Trespassing on Burial Places; Section 149 - Outrage to Religious Feelings; and 
Section 150 - Destroying or Damaging Public Buildings and Monuments. Note that in the 
Ordinance, unlike the Penal Law, this chapter is far removed from those dealing with 
offences against foreign states and piracy. 
150 The penalty in the Ordinance for disturbing religious worship is imprisonment for 
two months or a fine of twenty pounds, whereas in the Penal Law it is imprisonment for 
one year. This change to the Ordinance was made in 1966. See Criminal Code Ordinance 
(Amendment no. 28) Law 5726 - 1966. "Book of Laws" 481 (29 July 1966) pp. 64 - 68. See 
official English translation, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 20, 58. Of these offences against 
religion, the Queensland, Canadian and New-Zealand codes only include prohibitions 
against clergymen and worship (the latter two, dating some years earlier, also prohibit 
blasphemy). See, Queensland Criminal Code 1899, Part IV - Acts Injurious to the Public in 
General, Chapter XXI - Offences Relating to Religious Worship, Sections 206 - 207. 
Available at, fn. 134; The Canadian Criminal Code 1892, Title IV - Offences Against 
Religion, Morals and Public Convenience, Part XII - Offences Against Religion, Sections 
170 - 173. Available at, fn. 137; New Zealand Criminal Code 1893 Title IV - Crimes Against 
Religion, Morals and Public Convenience, Part XII - Crimes Against Religion, Sections 133 
- 135. Available at, fn. 155.  
151 Penal Law, Section 170 - Insult to Religion. 
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or knowledge of insult, this is apparently due to differing legislative 
drafting styles, with little substantive significance. It is difficult to imagine 
a case of knowingly desecrating a religiously venerated object without 
intended or expected insult152 so apparently this language is merely meant 
to exclude accidental or unintentional acts. And acts of unintentional insult 
to the flag are not penalized either. On the other hand, the punishment for 
desecrating religiously venerated objects is harsher, in that it does not 
include the option of a fine. This being the case even after the 2016 
amendment to the flag law, which raised the maximal punishment for flag 
desecration from one year to three. 
Though not directly relevant to the desecration of religious books, 
there is an additional prohibition in this article which restricts freedom of 
expression to protect religious sentiment. The prohibition of outrage to 
religious feelings states153: 
 
“A person who does any of the following is liable to imprisonment for 
one year: 
(1) Publishes any print, writing, picture or effigy calculated to 
outrage the religious feelings or belief of other persons; 
(2) Utters in a public place and in the hearing of another person 
any word or sound calculated to outrage his religious feelings or 
belief”. 
                                                          
152 However, at least theoretically, there is a possibility of desecrating a sacred object 
without knowledge that it is sacred. See, Criminal Case (Jerusalem Peace Court) 53179-10-
13, State of Israel v. John Does (10 November 2015). In this case, two Arab youths strolled 
through the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, treading upon graves, and removed 
prayer books from a cabinet they discovered, setting fire to them. They admitted to the 
facts but claimed they did not know that the books were sacred and did so merely as an 
act of playful mischief and should therefore only be convicted of deliberate damage to 
property. The court rejected their claim, observing that the acts were motivated either as 
an insult to religion or for racial reasons - which would aggravate the crime of deliberate 
damage to property - yet still convicted them only of deliberate damage to property. The 
court observed that at the very least they suspected that the books were sacred but ruled 
that such suspicion is not enough to establish the offense of insult to religion. Therefore, 
since neither of their two possible motivations could be proven beyond doubt, they were 
acquitted of both possibilities. It is noteworthy that the court’s conclusion that suspecting 
an object to be sacred is not sufficient for conviction was based on a comparison of the 
Hebrew language of Section 170 to that of Section 173 regarding the criminal intent 
required by the Mandatory legislator, concluding that Section 170 required more than mere 
suspicion. Though the Hebrew text is indeed legally binding, since the original language 
of both sections was English and since a comparison of the English language of both 
sections does not yield the same results, the conclusion drawn by the court is questionable. 
And see, High Court of Justice 351/72, Amos Keinan v. The Film Review Board (21 November 
1972). 
153 Penal Law, Section 173 - Insult to Religious Feelings. 
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As we see, the punishment for desecrating a sacred place or object is 
triple that for otherwise causing outrage to religion and religious sentiment. 
While this is understandable insofar as it pertains to a place of worship or 
even to a sacred object belonging to others, as such desecration involves 
trespass and vandalism along with the very desecration and insult to 
religion, each of which aggregating the severity of the other, the prohibition 
applies to desecration of a sacred object owned by the aggressor as well. It 
is only in such cases that the prohibition comes at the cost of restricting 
freedom of expression, and thus comes under the scope of our inquiry. In 
such cases, it is not immediately obvious why such desecration should be 
treated so much more harshly than outrage to religion by speech, print or 
actions other than physical desecration of the sacred. 
The answer to this may lie with the insight of "Collective Intellectual 
Property" shortly discussed above. The religious books and sacred articles 
of a Religion are morally the intellectual property of the collectivity of that 
Religion's adherents, just as flags belong to the collectivity of the nation. 
These collective intellectual property rights inhere in the collective. Hence, 
the “citizens” of religions naturally have the right to proscribe the 
desecration of their collective intellectual property as do the citizens of a 
state and members of a People, even if the physical ownership of that 
property lies with others. Therefore, desecrating these is much worse than 
otherwise insulting religion. 
That is what differentiates between cartooning Muhammad as a pig 
and burning the Koran, for example. In the latter case, it is not merely the 
very expression of the idea that the Koran is despicable and should be 
eliminated that would cause anguish to Muslims, but much more so the 
actual physical desecration of a tangible book which is deeply venerated 
and sanctified by them and is in fact their Collective Intellectual Property, 
part of their collective identity and personality.  
This principle that the Koran morally "belongs" to Muslims is 
simultaneously what makes such an act so abhorrent to them and to those 
that empathize with their pain, and that is also exactly what makes it so 
attractive to those who wish to offend their dignity and torment them. 
Likewise, this is the appeal of burning the flag, rather than merely chanting 
“America the red, white and blue, we spit on you, you stand for plunder, 
you will go under”. The very choice to burn the flag or the Koran in public 
is driven precisely by the desire to desecrate, antagonize and provoke those 
who cherish them. Otherwise, there are much simpler ways to express one's 
opinions about how evil, stupid or satanic America or Islam is, and what 
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their fate should be154. The aggresor in this case is unethically appropriating 
that which morally and inherently "belongs" to them, and is doing so purely 
for the sake of causing them anguish. Therefore, this rightly deserves a 
much harsher punishment. 
There have not been many cases in Israel of desecrating venerated 
objects, and those that have occurred involved the desecration of venerated 
objects that did not belong to the desecrator, through tresspass or 
vandalism. Such actions obviously do not fall under the protection of the 
principle of freedom of expression, and therefore do not shed light on the 
subject of this study into the proper limits of freedom of expression for the 
sake of tolerance and pluralism and the criminalization of expression that 
desecrates the "collective intellectual property" of nations or religions. 
Instead, the famous “pig poster” case, somewhat similar in nature to that of 
the Danish Cartoons and Charlie Hebdo, sheds light on how such 
desecration of a religiously venerated object would be treated by the 
authorities. 
In late June 1997, Tatiana Soskin created posters depicting a pig 
wearing a Kaffiyeh, labeled as Muhammad in Arabic and English, 
trampling a book similarly labeled as the Koran. She was accused of 
entering an area controlled by the Palestinian Authority in the city of 
Hebron and posting some of them to property belonging to the locals, thus 
“publishing” them as well as defacing property. 
In the District Court, she was convicted of attempted defacing of 
property, aggrevated by being racially motivated, and attempted unsult to 
religious feelings, since there was only enough evidence that she intended 
to paste the posters but not that she actually did so155. For this and 
additional charges for which she was tried and convicted together156, she 
received a combined sentence of three years’ imprisonment, one of them 
suspended for a probation period of three years157. The court stressed the 
                                                          
154 Whereas saying that Muhammad was a pig or depicting him as such may be driven 
by similarly deplorable motivation, the actual expression is ideational at core, and is in fact 
relevant to non-Muslims as well as Muslims. The public burning of a flag or a Koran, 
however, carries no significance to non-Muslims or non-patriots, for whom doing so is no 
more potent than simply stating one's opinion about them. See a short discussion of the 
distinction between ideational expression and expression lacking ideational value. 
155 Though not necessarily fully implemented, attempts may be punished as completed 
offences. 
156 The additional charges were identifying with a terrorist organization for wearing a 
T-shirt with an imprint of the “Kach” movement’s symbol, and throwing a stone at an Arab 
car thus endangering traffic. 
157 Criminal Case (Jerusalem District Court) 436/97, State of Israel v. Tatiana Soskin (8 
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centrality of insult to religious feelings within these charges, and ruled that 
the appropriate desert for it was close to the maximal punishment of 
imprisonment for one year. This, even after the court weighed her 
psychiatric background as reason for leniency158. An appeal of the 
conviction and the sentence to the Supreme Court was unanomously 
rejected159. 
Here too, as already seen above, we find a disparity between the 
treatment of violating national symbols and violating religious ones. 
Whereas violations of the Flag Law are dealt with forgivingly, not easily 
prosecuted and do not lead to actual imprisonment despite the maximal 
punishment available for them, attempting to cause outrage to religious 
feelings is punished harshly to the full extent of the law. 
This disparity is due to the dangerous consequences that often follow 
offences to Islam, but do not follow offences to national symbols. The 
enforcement authorities thus wish to deter offences to Islam more 
vigorously than offences to the flag. This rationale was in fact expressed by 
the court in response to the defense’s argument of selective enforcement, 
citing examples of comparable caricutures, some of which the court said 
were “highly shocking and potentially dangerous”, that were published but 
not prosecuted160. This consideration was echoed by the Supreme Court161. 
But while such a policy is definitely understandable, this “heckler’s 
veto”162, or “terrorists’ penal deterrence" of speech, is constitutionally 
problematic in that it rewards a culture of violence by protecting the 
feelings of those who subscribe to it and punishing those that offend it, 
while disadvantaging cultures that espouse tolerance by allowing offences 
to the sensibilities of their members. 
 
 
6 - Conclusions 
                                                          
January 1998). 
158 As well as her clear criminal record, and her remorse and promise to refrain from 
such behavior in the future. 
159 Criminal Appeal (Supreme Court) 697/98, Tatiana Soskin v. State of Israel (8 July 1998).  
160 Criminal Case (Jerusalem District Court) 436/97, State of Israel v. Tatiana Soskin (30 
December 1997). 
161 See, Criminal Appeal (Supreme Court) 697/98, Tatiana Soskin v. State of Israel (8 July 
1998), available at fn. 159, paragraph 43. 
162 The term "Heckler's Veto" refers to restricting the right to free speech because of 
reactions by its audience. See, e.g., R. McGAFFEY, The Heckler's Veto, in Marquette Law 
Review, 1/1973, p. 39 ss. 
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Israeli law curbs freedom of expression to protect national symbols and 
religiously venerated objects from desecration. Though the Flag Law is 
more detailed, the essential protection afforded to both is essentially 
similar. The paradigm expressed by the legislation regarding the flag and 
national symbols is that these belong to the nation, as manifested by the 
state, which created them. Hence, the state must consent to their use and 
protect them from harm, even overseas. It is feasible to entertain a similar 
paradigm regarding religious books and artifacts, as belonging to the 
collectivity of the Religion that venerates them. Such a paradigm has in fact 
been expressed in one case by an Israeli court, as well as in the minority 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court. This idea can also explain the 
harsher punishment for insulting religion by desecrating venerated objects 
than for otherwise insulting religious feelings. 
In principle, it appears that Israeli jurisprudence would penalize 
verbal desecration of the flag. We criticized this not only as an unnecessary 
and expansive interpretation of the Flag Law's language, but also as an 
extreme restriction upon the very core of freedom of expression. The 
criminalization of ideational speech is unjustified from a constitutional 
perspective. If one may not burn a flag, but is still able to express his 
opinions about the state and the flag which stands for it, then freedom of 
expression has not been significantly harmed. But if one is not able to 
express those very opinions, then nothing is left of freedom of expression.  
Previously, flag desecration was punishable by one years' 
imprisonment or a fine of 29,200 NIS. In 2016, the law was amended to bring 
the maximal punishment to three years imprisonment, in line with the 
punishment for insulting foreign flags, and doubling the fine. The 
prohibition of insulting foreign flags originated in the Criminal Code 
Ordinance of 1936, which was based on earlier British codes, and the 
harsher punishment for desecrating foreign flags than the domestic flag was 
due to historical oversight. 
Another amendment, made in 2004, enshrined the words of the 
national anthem into the law, but envisaged no desecration to it that might 
require its protection in a manner similar to the protection afforded to the 
state flag and emblem. The anthem's melody was also not included. In fact, 
cases of insult to the national anthem's language and melody have come up, 
in election campaigning.  
Secondary legislation regulates the proper flying and treatment of 
the flag and preservation of its dignity, but these regulations have rarely 
been enforced. Cognizant of the constitutional difficulty of suppressing 
expression, the Israeli prosecution and courts also apply the primary 
legislation very cautiously and sparingly, and mete out mild sentences in 
those cases that are indicted and convicted.  
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Though theoretically possible, and in fact used regarding offence to 
religious feelings, the charge of sedition was never considered in regards to 
flag desecration. A similar disparity exists between the hesitant 
enforcement of the Flag Law and the more vigorous enforcement of the 
prohibition of insult to religious feelings. While this is understandable in 
light of the violent consequences often experienced after offences to Islam, 
it poses a constitutional problem and discriminates in favor of violence. 
 
 
 
